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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GLEN F. NIELSEN and ALTA R.
NIELSEN, his wife,
Respondents,

vs.

Case No.

8817
W. R. RUCKER and
RUCKER, his wife,

ADDIE

W.

Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, defendants below, are the owners of a
motel, a home and a small apartment, all adjoining, in the
City of Tremonton, Utah. The respondents are the owners
of a farm, variously described, just north of Brigham City
on the highway to Collinston, Utah. Both parties had
listed their respective properties for sale, and fortunately,
or unfortunately, the same real estate broker represented
both parties in the transactions that led to the agreement
asserted by the respondents and to no agreement as claimed
by the appellants.
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The court below found that an agreement had been
consummated and decreed its specific performance. The
appellants. here seek review contending that there was no
agreement at all, or, in the alternative, that any existing
agreement was sufficiently indefinite as to terms and conditions that the parties should be left to their remedies at
law for damages and similar relief.
The facts were all in dispute and, as this is an equity
this Court is entitled to review all of the evidence and
to determine its weight, its relevancy and its probativeness.
We are here content to rely upon specific exhibits that will
hereafter be mentioned and discussed and our references to
the transcript will be few. And we are confident that a
decree sounding in specific performance can be shown to
be erroneous and that it must be reversed.
case~

As has been stated, respondents were the owners of
a dairy farm north of Brigham City. It was represented
to consist of 110 acres with certain water rights, certain
equipment and certain livestock. The farm was purportedly
being purchased from LuRoy P. Deem under a contract
and escrow agreement. The livestock were the subject of
a chattel mortgage to the Bank of Utah at Brigham City.
A certified copy of this chattel mortgage was introduced
in evidence as Exhibit "U". The real estate broker, Peterson, testified that Exhibits "E", "F" and "K", among other
papers, were prepared and were executed by respondents
for the purpose of carrying out the details of the transaction (R. 63, 64). In order to avoid repetition these Exhibits
will be more fully discussed in connection with our argument as to the points upon which we rely.
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We should also note here that Exhibits "A" and "B",
either together, or separately, constitute the agreement between the parties, if there is an agreement. Respondents
contend that Exhibit "B" is an amendment to Exhibit "A"
and that the two must be read together to ascertain the
intention of the parties. Appellants, during the trial, contended that the respondents became unable to perform under
Exhibit "A" and that it thereupon became a nullity; and
that it was completely superseded by Exhibit "B". In our
present view of this matter, these contentions become somewhat immaterial and we now urge that, whether Exhibits
"A" and "B" are considered together or separately, they
are sufficiently uncertain that specific performance is not
the proper remedy. Again, and in order to avoid repeating
their contents, we will leave specific discussion of these
exhibits to the argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THE PURPORTED CONTRACT, IF ONE
EXISTS AT ALL, IS SUFFICIENTLY INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT IS IMPROPER TO DECREE ITS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE PURPORTED CONTRACT, IF ONE
EXISTS AT ALL, IS SUFFICIENTLY INDEFI-
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NITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT IS IMPROPER TO DECREE ITS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

It has been said that "a contract for sale, mortgage,
or conveyance of real property or interest therein, under
the authorities, must be definite, must be certain, and must
be unambiguous in its essential and material terms and
provisions. before a court of equity will decree its specific
performance." 81 Corpus Juris Secundum on Specific Performance, Section 31 (b) at page 486.
"Specific performance will not be decreed unless the
terms of the contract are so definite and certain that the
acts to be performed can be ascertained and that the court
can determine whether or not the performance rendered is
in accord with the contractual duty assumed." 5 Corbin
on Contracts, Sec. 1174 at page 756.
Referring again to Exhibits "A" and "B", which must
be held to be the contract between the parties as asserted
by the respondents, the only description contained therein
as to the property to be transferred by the respondents is
the phrase "dairy farm owned by Glen Nielsen and wife"
and again in Exhibit "A" is the phrase "their dairy farm,
with all equipment." Can it be said that this is a sufficient
description of the real property involved'!
A further look at the other exhibits is even more revealing. Exhibit "E" is the tendered "Assignment of Contract and Escrow Agreement." The respondents' witness,
Peterson, testified that this was to carry out the terms of
the transfer ( R. 63) . This assignment has been executed
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by the respondents and purports to transfer the respondents' interest in their contract and escrow agreement with
LeRoy P. Deem as to three specifically described parcels of
land.
Exhibit "F" was also a part of the details to effect this
purported transfer of the property. It appears to have
been executed by the respondents and is notarized by the
same Peterson, who was a witness for the respondent during the trial, on April 6, 1957. It contains the same description of the same three parcels as is contained in Exhibit "E". Of the utmost importance is the fact that the
total acreage contained in these descriptions will not exceed
52 acres.
Yet the trial court, in his findings, conclusions and
decree, directs the specific performance of the supposed
agreement and directs the conveyance by the respondents
of four parcels of land having a total acreage of approximately one hundred and eleven acres (R. 26, 27, 31 and 32).
(Italics ours.)
Respondents were apparently relying upon an agreement that only required the delivery by them of deeds to
fifty odd acres. We respectfully urge that the trial court
had no right to require specific performance of some different agreement and we further contend that this set of
facts clearly reveals that there was no agreement at all.
May we again refer to Exhibit "F" and to the last
sentence in the description which reads "subject to a reservation in the grantors of 1!2 of all mineral and oil rights
of said property". Admittedly, this reservation was no part

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
of the contract as set out in Exhibits "A" and "B", or
either of them; and the record was completely silent as
to any discussion or agreement between the parties as to
such a reservation. But the respondents tender performance wih such a reservation. It is again our contention and
we urge upon this Court that the appellants' refusal to
proceed further was fully justified.
81 Corpus Juris Secundum on Specific Performance,
Sec. 33 at page 488, states:
"Except where uncertainty or ambiguity has
been removed or cured by the parties, a court of
equity will not decree specific performance of a
contract for the sale, exchange, or conveyance of
land, or an interest therein, unless the contract designates or describes the land with definiteness and
certainty or furnishes or refers to means or data
by which it can be identified and located with certainty by the aid of admissible extrinsic evidence,
such as public records, maps, or other documents,
and without recourse to inadmissible extrinsic evidence as to the intention of the parties. The contract may be specifically enforced where extrinsic
evidence is required to apply, but not where it is
required to supply, the description of the property
involved." (Italics ours.)
One other matter is of prime importance. Pervading
the record and as specifically illustrated at R. 180 is the
statement of the appellant, W. R. Rucker, that he was to
assume the chattel mortgage on the respondents' livestock
and pay this mortgage at the rate of $175.00 per month.
The tendered Bill of Sale, Exhibit "K", dated AprilS, 1957,
specifically provided that the remaining balance of this
mortgage in the sum of $8454.54 was to be payable at the
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rate of not less than $175.00 per month. It is not difficult
to imagine respondents' consternation when they discovered
that this sum of money was all due on December 1, 1957,
a matter of only months, as is shown by Exhibit "U". This
clearly was a sufficient ground upon which to declare the
transaction at an end and to refuse to perform. The trial
court wholly and completely neglected and overlooked this
phase of the transaction and made no finding thereon.
Again, 81 Corpurs Juris Secundum on Specific Performance, Section 34C (1) at page 493, contains the following specific rule :
"In order to warrant a decree of specific performance thereof, a contract must be reasonably definite and certain with respect to the time, place and
manner of payment or performance."
And further at page 494 appears the following:
"Where payment by the terms of the contract
is to be deferred, but the time of payment is not
specified, the uncertainty is fatal."
We respectfully submit that the present case shows unequivocally that it was the intent of the parties that the
time of payment of this assumed chattel mortgage be deferred. The further fact that it was an impossibility to
defer such payment should be equally fatal.
Cases dealing with specific performance and its many
phases are legion, but a case with facts similar to the one
at bar has not been found. Two recent cases from neighboring states appear sufficiently in point to permit of their
citation.
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The Idaho case of Crouch v. Bischoff, 280 P. 2d 419,
at page 422, states the rule as follows:
"A greater degree of certainty is required to
sustain a decree for specific performance than is
required to sustain a judgment for damages at law,
Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P. 2d 351,
and an agreement which leaves any of the material
terms or conditions for future determination cannot be enforced."
And in the Montana case of Steen v. Rustad, 313 P.
2d 1014, the Court at page 1020 said:
"It is of course well settled that a contract to
be specifically enforceable must be complete and
certain in all essential matters included within its
scope. Nothing must be left to conjecture or surmise, or be so vague as to make it impossible for
the court to glean the intent of the parties from
the instrument, or the acts sought to be enforced."

And this same Court continued:
"It is also universally held that cases like the
present one rest upon their own peculiar facts and
circumstances. Rarely do we find one case identical
to another, or so fashioned in fact and law, that
we can say one is on all fours with another. Therefore we find equity giving relief in one situation
and denying it in another where the facts seem to
be, but are not, quite identical.

"The Montana cases of Long v. Needham, supra,
and Reeves v. Littlefield, supra, illustrate the proposition that each controversy must be bottomed on
its own facts and circumstances. This court, although guided by precedent, will not be bound thereby since each case presents its own peculiar prob-
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lem. Therefore, in arriving at a just result, we will
not be guided by any one case, but rather will interpret the facts of this case in the light of the many
cases which have already been decided."

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the supposed contract,
the lands to be covered thereby and the extent of the interest therein and the terms of payment and the manner
thereof were vague and indefinite and uncertain. The decree of the trial court clearly proposes to specifically enforce an alleged contract that neither of the parties had
agreed to prior to the trial.
Whether there was a contract at all, and the evidence
is compelling that there was none, need not be here determined. Suffice it to say that there was a complete absence of that type of evidence that is clear and compelling
and a prerequisite to a decree of specific performance.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE M. MASON,
JOSEPH C. FOLEY,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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